Conflicts and disputes, whether they are related to business or politics, usually end with ex-ante inefficient settlements including war. Crisis bargaining models equipped with informational asymmetries and audience costs are extensively analyzed in economics and political science literature to provide rational explanations for these long-standing wars of nerves. This paper investigates the role of communication -another important dimension of conflicts-and the parameters that are likely to determine the bitterness of rational actors in communicating. Usual informational perturbations, such as negotiators' values for the stake or the settlement, reinforce the impacts of audience costs and lead to an impracticable conclusion that sending milder messages in conflicts are simply communicative mishaps. In this regard, a relevant but disregarded source of uncertainty, that results more plausible and empirically testable hypotheses, is examined. * I would like to thank Emin Karagozoglu, Kevin Hasker and seminar participants at Bilkent University. All the remaining errors are my own.
impact of audience costs, cannot explain this empirical observation. With the choice of informational asymmetry I examine, the model in this paper makes it evident that states' previously-established reputations (that are possibly built in similar past crises) would explain this empirical phenomenon. More specifically, equilibrium analysis shows that a state with a high reputation of being "passive-commitment" type most likely sends a message that generates lower audience costs if the state's stake in the contest is small. 6 In the model, there are two "threats" that states can utilize to make their commitments credible: Possibility of war and obstinate types. A state that is more sensitive to audience costs, say state 1, will benefit the possibility of a costly end after some escalation (i.e., war). 7 On the other hand, the state that is less sensitive to audience costs, i.e. state 2, will derive advantage from using the second threat because it can build its reputation faster. 8 Therefore, the effectiveness of these two threats determines the advantageous state. If the cost of war or the uncertainty regarding the states' flexibility is high (such that the danger of war following a possibly lengthy escalation becomes a risky option), then the state that is less sensitive to audience costs will be in an advantageous position.
Section 2 explains the model. Equilibrium strategies of the crises bargaining game for the case with no communication between states are characterized in Section 3. Section 4 examines the case with strategic communication. Section 5 presents the comparative statics results. Finally, Section 6 makes some closing remarks.
The Model
Two states (or leaders)-1 and 2-are in dispute over a prize worth v > 0. The crisis occurs in continuous time. At the beginning, time t = 0, state leaders simultaneously choose a message, and then the dispute and the messages become public. "Messages" can be sent only once and can be thought of either as political promises or as political acts such as sanctions/embargoes, mobilizing or preparing troops. 9 There are two messages states can pick-Faint (f ) or Strong (s). Moreover, at all times t ≥ 0 before the crisis ends, each state can choose to escalate, yield, or attack. The crisis ends when one or 6 State i's reputation of being "passive-commitment" type is its (prior) probability that the obstinate state i is of passive type who sends the weak message. 7 Since state 1 can generate higher audience costs, it would be the first player to attack. 8 Similar to Fearon (1994) , I find that regardless of the initial conditions, the state that is less sensitive to audience costs is always more likely to back down in disputes that become public contests. 9 As Fearon (1997) expresses, the messages are tying-hand (not sunk-cost) signals, which work by creating (audience) costs that the leadership would accumulate and suffer in case of a failure in the management of the crisis. Finally, I assume that both states have some positive probability of being a commitment type which never backs down. More formally, a commitment type of state i is identified by the message m i ∈ M and implementing a simple strategy: It always sends the message m i at time zero and never yields to its opponent. 11 The initial probability 10 If one state chooses to attack at time t and the other chooses to yield or attack at the same time, both states receive −w. However, if both yield at time t, then state i receives v 2 − tc mi i . Finally, if states escalate the conflict forever, both get some payoff strictly less than −w. These particular assumptions are not crucial because simultaneous concessions or attacks, or escalation with infinite horizon occurs with probability 0 in equilibrium. An equilibrium property that there is no escalation forever also follows from the assumptions on commitment types. 11 I also assume that the commitment types understand the equilibrium and start the war (immediately) once they are convinced that their opponent is also a commitment type. This assumption specifies how the crisis game ends when both states are commitment types.
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Strategies
A strategy for state i ∈ {1, 2} has two parts. The first part µ i ∈ [0, 1] denotes the probability of rational state i sending the strong message at time zero. Given µ i , denote by z i (s) [equivalently z i (f )] the posterior probability that state i is aggressive [equivalently passive] commitment type. Therefore, the Bayes' rule implies that
The second part σ i = (F i , Q i ) has also two parts. Let F be the set of all rightcontinuous distribution functions defined over R + ∪ {∞}. Then, 14 Given Fm j and Qm j , rational state i's expected payoff (in the subgame following the message realizationm) of conceding at time t is
with Fm j (t − ) = lim y↑t Fm j (y) and Qm j (t − ) = lim y↑t Qm j (y).
15
13 See Footnote 18. 14 Note that, for anym, the distribution functions (Fm i , Qm i ) are state j's belief about state i's play during the escalation. Given that i sends the message m i at time zero, state j believes that i is rational with probability 1 − z i (m i ). Since commitment types never back down, we must have lim t→∞ Fm i (t) ≤ 1 − z i (m i ). 15 Note that U i (t, Fm j , Qm j ) is evaluated at time zero.
Absence of Strategic Communication
In this section, I analyze a special case of the crisis game, in which the states cannot send a message at the beginning. Therefore, strategy of state i is just the pair of distribution functions σ i = (F i , Q i ) defined in the previous section. This special case conveys the flavor of the analysis and, it is the basic building block for the strategic communication case studied subsequently. Throughout this section, I assume that the states' audience costs are c 1 (t) = c 1 t and c 2 (t) = c 2 t where c 1 > c 2 .
Complete Rationality
To have a benchmark result, suppose for now that both states are known to be rational, i.e., z = 0. Rational state i does not escalate the dispute beyond the time t i where its audience costs is equal to the cost of war, i.e. t i c i = w. Since state 1 can generate higher audience costs (as c 1 > c 2 ), it would be the first player to attack (as t 1 < t 2 ).
However, state 2 can anticipate that delaying the concession has no benefit, and thus in equilibrium, concedes at time zero. Hence, in equilibrium, the conflict resolves before it escalates, and payoffs of state 1 and 2 are v and 0, respectively.
Uncertainty on Rationality
Now, I resume the case where z > 0. In equilibrium, each state concedes by choosing randomly the timing of backing down with a decreasing hazard rate. Escalation of the conflict stops at some finite (deterministic) time t * , a function of primitives, with certainty and no state attacks before this time.
In equilibrium, state 2's instantaneous concession rate (i.e. the hazard rate) is higher.
That is, state 2 can build its reputation much faster. This is a standard result in war of attrition games: Since state 1 generates higher audience costs, it can be indifferent between conceding now and delaying concession a bit if the gain from delay is sufficiently higher. State 1's benefit from delay is determined by the likelihood of the second state's concession during the period of delay, implying that in equilibrium, state 2 must yield at a rate faster than that of state 1.
As there is an uncertainty on states' flexibility, there are two devices that rational players can utilize to make their commitment credible. The first one is the cost of war and the ability of generating audience costs, and the second one is the possibility of mimicking the commitment type. If the cost of war is low (i.e., z ≤ v v+w ), then the former commitment device is more effective. As we see in the complete rationality case, the threat of war gives the advantage to state 1 because 1 can generate its audience costs faster. However, if the cost of war is high, so that z > v v+w , then it is risky to use this threat. Thus, the second commitment device becomes more effective. In this case, state 2 has the full advantage because 2 can build its reputation faster. Proposition 1. The unique sequential equilibrium of the crisis game G is characterized by the following conditions: For i = 1, 2,
4. Q i (t) = 0 for all t < t * and Q i (t) = 1 − F i (t * ) for all t ≥ t * . and backing down, (ii) at most one player backs down with a positive probability at time zero, and (iii) there exists a finite time t * at which each player's posterior probability of being the commitment type reaches 1 simultaneously and escalation stops.
I defer the proofs to
The first property in our case is replaced with a decreasing hazard rate
. 16 Since the audience costs (of state j) increases with time, the instantaneous concession rate (of state i) must be bigger at earlier times of the escalation to make the opponent indifferent between yielding and escalating at all times.
Property (ii) -only one state can back down at time zero-implies the second condition in Proposition 1. Furthermore, when the cost of war is large enough, (iii) is true and thus, it implies F i (t * ) = 1 − z for i = 1, 2. However, for sufficiently small values of w, rational state 1 is indifferent between attacking and backing down at the time t * . Since equilibrium strategies, F i 's, must be continuous over (0, t * ] (implied by the properties 16 Let h i be the state i's instantaneous rate of concession (backing down) at time t conditional on that no state has backed down or attacked before time t. In equilibrium, player j must be indifferent between backing down at time t and escalating for an infinitesimal period ∆ and then backing down at time t + ∆ (assuming, without loss of generality, that c i (t + ∆) < w for i = 1, 2, so that both states prefer backing down over attacking before time t + ∆). State j's expected payoff of following these two strategies (in equilibrium) are −tc j and h i ∆v + (1 − h i ∆)(−c j (t + ∆)) where h i ∆ is the probability that state i backs down during the period ∆. Equating these two yields h i = cj v+tcj +∆cj , and taking its limit as ∆ approaches zero gives the value of h i at time t.
(i) and (ii)), rational state 1 will attack at time t * even 1 is convinced that 2 is the commitment type. Therefore, in equilibrium, state 1's posterior probability of being the commitment type does not reach 1 at time t * , that is F 1 (t * ) < 1 − z. As a result, in the equilibrium of the crisis game, t * must solve F i (t * ) = 1 − z for at least one of the states i ∈ {1, 2}, as it is stated in the third condition of Proposition 1.
The third condition pins down the identity of the player who needs to back down at time zero as well as the probability of such a concession, and hence establishes the uniqueness of the equilibrium. Finally, the fourth condition implies that war is strictly inferior to backing down at all times t < t * .
Lemma 1. The crisis game G ends by time t * = min{t * 1 , t * 2 } where for i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i = j, t * i = min{
Proof. Rational state 1 will not escalate the dispute once it is convinced that state 2 is the commitment type. Given that 2 does not back down with positive probability at time zero, state 1 will be convinced regarding 2's obstinacy by the time τ 2 solving
. Also, state 1 will not back down after time t satisfying tc 1 = w. Therefore, in equilibrium, state 1 must stop escalation before , τ 1 , τ 2 }. However, since only one state can back down with positive probability at time zero, escalation will continue with some positive probability until time t * and stop at this time with certainty.
The following two lemma solve the equilibrium value of t * as a function of the primitives, and find the equilibrium strategies F 1 (t) and F 2 (t).
Lemma 2. In equilibrium, if t * i > t * j where i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i = j, then we have
Lemma 3. In equilibrium, if t * 1 = t * 2 , then we have F i (t) = 1 − v v+tc j for i, j ∈ {1, 2} and
Equilibrium Payoffs
State i is called strong if t * i < t * j and weak otherwise. Equivalently, state i is strong if and only if state j backs down with positive probability at time zero, i.e F j (0) > 0, and according to Proposition 1, at most one state can be strong in equilibrium. 17 Since each state is indifferent between backing down and escalating until the time t * , the equilibrium expected payoff of rational state i is the same at all times t ∈ [0, t * ], and is equal to what state i can achieve at time zero. Hence, state i's equilibrium payoff in the crisis game (evaluated at time zero) is
Note that, equilibrium payoff of the weak state is always 0, whereas it is (strictly) positive for the strong state. Next proposition determines the identity of the strong state in equilibrium. . The last inequality yields the desired inequality. 17 In equilibrium, both states are weak if t * i = t * j holds. 18 Suppose for a moment that rational states can send one of two messages -strong and faint-at time zero, and there exists a single commitment type that sends, say, the strong message. Then, the equilibrium analysis of the crisis game under this configuration does not add anything new to the equilibrium analyses presented in this subsection. By Myerson (1991) we know that one sided asymmetry makes the player, that is known to be rational, weak in equilibrium, and according to the analysis in the previous subsection (complete rationality), 1 is the advantageous state if two states are known to be rational. As a result, under this setup there does not exist an equilibrium where both states send the faint message with a positive probability since sending this message reveals the states' rationality.
Presence of Strategic Communication
In this section, I resume the case where each state can send one of two messages in the set M = {f, s}. What is new in multi-message case is that the democratic state (state 1) can be strong in equilibrium even when the cost of war is high. However, this is possible only if z 1 -the prior belief that state 1 is passive commitment type-is sufficiently high, i.e., z 1 ≥
. It is clear from the last inequality that, in equilibrium, state 1 will never be strong for high values of w if, for example, the asymmetry between the messages' ability of generating audience costs (ρ) is more than or equal to the asymmetry between the states' power of generating audience costs (θ). This observation is conveying an important hint regarding the dynamics of the equilibrium strategies. As ρ ≥ θ holds, state 1 will be generating its audience costs faster than state 2 for all messages, and this is the advantage of state 2 making it strong player when the cost of war is high. However, when ρ < θ, state 2 loses its advantage once states 1 and 2 choose the weak and strong messages, respectively.
Thus, for large values of z 1 and θ, rational state 1 can exploit the disadvantage of state 2 and use both the threat of war and of uncertainty regarding its rationality to have a positive expected payoff in equilibrium whenever the cost of war is high. Here is how it will work: In equilibrium, both states send each message with a positive probability. However, as z 1 takes higher values, state 1 will pick the strong message with a lower probability, and so the posterior probability that state 1 is a commitment type conditional on sending the strong message will be higher. Therefore, state 1 can push its initial reputationposterior belief -ahead of state 2's at time zero by sending the strong message. With this, state 1 can eliminate the second state's advantage -building reputation fasterwhen the cost of war is high. On the other hand, picking the faint message with a high probability might put state 1 in a disadvantageous position in terms of the initial reputations (depending on the value of θ and z 2 ). However, in equilibrium, state 1 can eliminate this as well by threatening state 2 by war. That is, state 1 plays a strategy that dictates it to attack with a positive probability after some escalation. Following a strategy that threatens the opponent by war is risky as the cost of war is high. However, in equilibrium, rational state 1 can decrease this risk by using this threat only when state 2 sends the weak message, in which case escalation lasts much longer.
The next result is nothing but a restatement of the Proposition 1 for the multiple message case. Therefore, in equilibrium, when state i is strong, its expected payoff in the crisis game is positive and state j( = i) is weak with the equilibrium payoff of 0. Let (µ * , σ * ), where
, be an equilibrium strategy profile of the crisis game G. Proposition 3 is characterizing σ * (for both players). The following results characterize the first part of the equilibrium strategy profile, µ * i , whenever state i is strong. For weak states, the first part is fully characterized in the appendix. whenever θ ≤ ρ.
Parallel to the implications of Proposition 2, state 1, which can generate higher audience costs, is the strong state in equilibrium whenever the cost benefit ratio of the conflict ( , then state 2 is strong, state 1 is weak and µ * 2 =
, then state 1 is strong, state 2 is weak and µ * 1 is equal either to
Fix the values of the primitives (i.e. z, z 1 , z 2 , v, w, ρ and θ) that satisfy the premises of one of the previous three propositions (i.e. Propositions 5 through 7). Then, in all equilibria (µ * 1 , µ * 2 ) for the specified parameter values, only one state (and the same state) is the strong player. However, the next result shows that for all parameter values that are not covered by Propositions 5-7, two types of equilibria coexist: State 1 is strong player in one type and 2 is strong in the other.
, then (i) if state 1 is strong, then µ * 1 is equal either to
. 
By comparing

Comparative Statics
In this section, I present some comparative statics results and defer the proofs of the claims to the Appendix. The next table summarizes the results in the previous section and presents the equilibrium strategies µ * 1 and µ * 2 for all possible parameter values. 
where
By using this table, one can easily check that the following two claims are true. , state 1 is weakly more aggressive than 2.
19 When z > v v+w , the same is true in all equilibria except one. In that equilibrium, state 1 is strong and the escalation ends with war (with a positive probability) as state 2 sends the faint message.
20
The next observation points out that a state with a high reputation of being passivecommitment type most likely sends a message that generates lower audience costs if the state's stake in the contest is small. Observation 2. In equilibrium, for any state i, if z, z i are high and v is low enough,
The next observation summarizes how primitives affect the states' aggressiveness and the length of horizon (or equivalently the length of escalation) in the crisis game. 21 The length of escalation depends on the messages states send. Escalation time is longer as the states are less aggressive, and for any given set of parameters, the length of the horizon is the longest when both states send the faint message at time zero.
19 More formally, the highest value of µ * 1 in row (1) is bigger than or equal to the highest value of µ * 2 in row (5) . 20 This equilibrium corresponds to µ Observation 3. In equilibrium,
1. if the cost of war (w) increases, then the states become less aggressive (that is, they choose the weak message with a higher probability 22 ), it is more likely that escalation lasts longer.
2. as the value of the prize (v) increases, the length of the escalation (weakly) increases 23 and the states become (weakly) more aggressive. The final observation below summarizes the relationship between θ and the probability of initial resolution (i.e., the likelihood that the crisis game ends at time zero with no escalation). , the probability of initial resolution increases only if state 1 is strong. 22 Recall that for a given set of parameters, there may exist multiple equilibrium strategies µ * . In that case, I consider only the highest values. Also, µ * does not necessarily and continuously decrease with w. This is because as w increases the equilibrium strategies might change their form. 23 There are some parameter values (for the primitives other than v) in which increase in v does not affect the (equilibrium) escalation time, and for all other parameter values, it increases the length of the horizon. 24 There are some parameter values (for the primitives other than v) in which increase in v does not affect the value of the highest µ * , and for all other parameter values the highest value of µ * increases.
Concluding Remarks
This paper develops a reputation-based model to highlight the roles of strategic communication and audience costs on conflicts. Given the message selections of the states, equilibrium has a unique horizon: A level of escalation after which either both states' reputation simultaneously reaches one, or alternatively neither side will yield because the cost of backing down is higher than attacking, making war inevitable.
Equilibrium analysis shows, in contrast to the conventional wisdom, that the ability of generating higher audience costs is not always an advantage. A state that is sensitive to audience costs is in an unfavorable position whenever the cost of war or the states' initial reputation of being a commitment type is high. Escalation and increasing audience costs make war an optimal outcome for rational players, but war is not an inevitable outcome because states would convince each other of their determinacy before attacking becomes an optimal action.
The model also has a rich set of empirically testable hypotheses. For example, a state that has a high reputation of being passive-commitment type most likely sends the weak message that generates lower audience costs when its (conflicting) stake is small. A state that is sensitive to audience costs is more aggressive (for almost all parameter values) and can drive benefit from strategic communication only if states are in the same dyad.
The length of escalation increases but aggressiveness of the states decreases with the cost of war.
Messages: State 1 State 2
Proof of Proposition 4 . Suppose for a contradiction that there is such an equilibrium (µ * , σ * ) where both states' ex-ante payoffs are positive. If a state's expected payoff is positive when it sends the strong message, then its expected payoff must also be positive if it sends the weak message, and vice-versa. Therefore, there are two possible cases we need to consider. 
However, these four conditions cannot hold simultaneously because inequalities (1) and
whereas (3) and (4) In equilibrium, σ * is unique but µ * is not. In some equilibria (µ * , σ * ) where state i is strong, state i's equilibrium payoff in some subgames can be 0, though its expected payoff in the crisis game is positive. Restricting attention only to strict equilibria (whenever they exist) will eliminate such equilibrium strategy profiles, and this restriction does not affect the main essence of the remaining analysis and results. However, it substantially simplifies the proofs by reducing the number of possible cases we need to consider. On the other hand, when θ ≤ ρ, there is no equilibrium where both (A1) and (B2) hold: Suppose for a contradiction that there is such an equilibrium. The condition
. However, this equality contradicts with condition (A1) because τ ss 2 = w. Similar arguments for m = f yields the desired contradiction. Therefore, in equilibrium where state 2 is strong, only (A1) and (B1) will hold. We
and
. The last two inequality yields θ <
. Also, since τ . Then, there exists no equilibrium strategy profile (µ * , σ * ) where both states are weak.
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that there exists such (µ * , σ * ) . Therefore, we must
. By
(1) and (2) we have µ *
. Similarly, by (1) and (3) . However, the equality in (5) cannot be true if z 1 ≤ z 2 because by assumption θ < 1. On the other hand, when z 1 > z 2 we have
> ρ contradicting with (ii), i.e. θ ≤ ρ. , implying that 0 > z 2 (1 − ρ).
Finally, with the µ
. Also, since z 1 < 1 we must have z > vρ vρ+θw , which is higher than v v+w as ρ ≥ θ, yielding a contradiction.
Lemma 5.5. There is no equilibrium where both (A1) and (B2) hold.
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that (A1) and (B2) hold. The equilibrium condition
. However, (A1) implies that τ sf 1 < w and given the value of µ * 1 we have z 2 > 1.
Lemma 5.6. There is no equilibrium where both (A2) and (B1) hold.
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that (A2) and (B1) hold. The equilibrium condition
. However, (B1) implies that τ f f 1 < w ρ and given the value of µ * 1 we have z 2 > 1.
Lemma 5.7. There exists an equilibrium where both (A2) and (B2) hold and µ * 1 satisfies
for all values of z 1 .
Proof. Note that in this case state 1's threat of war is binding. Therefore, (A2) and (B2) hold for state 1, i.e. τ Lemma 5.9. There is no equilibrium where both (A4) and (B2) hold.
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that (A4) and (B2) hold. The equilibrium condition
. However, given the value of µ * 1 we have τ Proof of Proposition 6 . Lemma A.7 gives the equilibrium value of µ * 2 . I will prove the claim (that state 2 must be strong) with a series of Lemma. Suppose for a contradiction that state 2 is weak. By Lemma A.8, there exists no equilibrium strategy profile (µ * , σ * )
where both states are weak. Thus, state 1 must be strong. The first lemma considers the case where ρ ≥ θ. In this case, z 1 ≤
is not binding since the right hand side, in this case, is strictly bigger than 1. The second lemma considers the case where
and ρ < θ. and µ *
. The last two inequality implies that θ > 
, and
. By (3) and (4), we have
. Note that B > A because otherwise we would have µ * 2 ≥ 1. Now, notice that (1) can be correct in equilibrium if . Since (7) is true for all z 1 satisfying (2), we can rewrite (7) as z 2 < . The last inequality implies that z 2 [θρwz − vρ(1 − z)] > θρwz − θv(1 − z) which contradicts that θ ≤ ρ. , contradicting with our assumption. Hence, in equilibrium state 2 must be weak. Moreover, by Lemma A.8 both states cannot be weak, implying that state 1 must be strong in equilibrium. Now I want to characterize the equilibrium strategies of strong state 1. In equilibrium, state 1 is strong whenever one of (Ai)'s and (Bj)'s (in the proof of Proposition 5, Case . Therefore, the last two imply that z < . By (A1), we have . We need to show that the last fraction is greater than , we must have ≤ z 1 contradicting with ( * ).
Hence, for all possible cases, as w increases, escalation length also increases.
Initial Concessions
Next three cases analyze the highest values of Fm i (0)'s (initial concessions of the states) in equilibrium. , then as θ increases, the probability of resolution Fm 1 (0) decreases for all possible values of primitives and realized messages whenever state 1 is weak. However, the probability of resolution increases (weakly) if state 1 is strong (which happens when θ is large enough so that z 1 > ρ(1−θ) θ (1−ρ) ).
